OPINION — Strategic intelligence, normally perceived as intelligence supporting the formulation of technique, has at all times had restricted affect over nationwide safety choices. Leaders in democratic international locations, not to mention in authoritarian ones, have their very own ideological views of the world, and their very own imaginative and prescient of how to form the world. They don’t rely solely on their intelligence companies for sense-making of the strategic atmosphere. However within the circumstances of the US and Israel, the demand for strategic intelligence may be declining.
Each the US and Israel are more and more implementing preventive methods, initiating preventive campaigns whereas utilizing brute pressure, which aimed to coerce the adversary via compellence somewhat than via deterrence. The preventive strategy just isn’t new; Israel, as an illustration, has at all times aimed toward stopping its adversaries from buying nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the implementation of this strategy has accelerated.
This was the case, as an illustration, within the June 2025 Israeli marketing campaign towards Iran, meant to forestall the Islamic Republic from growing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, augmented by US strikes additionally aimed toward stopping Iran from growing nuclear weapons. Deterrence was not working to alter Iran’s calculus and actions, therefore compellence was wanted. Within the US operation to seize Venezuelan president Maduro in January 2026, the US as soon as once more utilized compellence utilizing brute pressure. Deterrence was not working to alter Venezuela’s conduct, therefore compellence was wanted. The present US and Israeli campaigns towards Iran are probably the most vivid illustration of the preventive strategy, with Israel and the US taking the initiative and making use of compellence. Each the US and Israel have declared that this marketing campaign is meant to forestall Iran from growing nuclear weapons, in addition to to negate Iran from its regional energy projection capabilities. And no less than within the case of Israel, additionally to result in regime change. Deterring Iran from additional growing its nuclear and missile capabilities was as soon as once more not working.
The applying of those preventive and proactive methods may illustrate a declining demand for strategic intelligence. First, such methods are largely aimed toward degrading adversary capabilities, successfully assuming that understanding adversary intentions and manipulating them, primarily via deterrence, just isn’t sufficient. Therefore, operational-level intelligence analyzing adversary facilities of gravity, operational and technical intelligence analyzing adversary army and industrial initiatives, and above all, concentrating on intelligence, is extra essential than strategic intelligence making an attempt to decipher adversary intentions and rationale. Within the case of Iran, as an illustration, the US and Israel appear to have determined that the Iranian intentions for growing nuclear capabilities are threats which have to be prevented, no matter whether or not the Iranians certainly intend to make use of nuclear weapons sooner or later.
Second, leaders more and more decide the “imminency degree” of threats primarily based on their imaginative and prescient and beliefs, not simply on intelligence assessments. That is particularly evident within the present marketing campaign towards Iran. Within the US, DNI Gabbard lately talked about that solely the US president decides if a menace is certainly imminent, referring to the Iranian nuclear challenge. In Israel, Prime Minister Natanyahu talked about that Israel needed to take motion because the Iranians had been transferring their infrastructures into underground amenities, thus denying Israel from the power to assault these infrastructures. As soon as once more, strategic intelligence about adversary future intentions appears much less essential than operational intelligence about adversary capabilities, not to mention than concentrating on intelligence, resembling that produced by Israel for eliminating Iran’s political and army management at first of the present marketing campaign towards Iran, or by US in January 2026 to seize Maduro.
Third, leaders more and more mistrust the standard of strategic intelligence produced by their intelligence companies. Within the US, as an illustration, President Trump has persistently expressed mistrust in DNI’s Gabbard assessments concerning Iran, and through his first time period, urged intelligence professionals to “return to high school”. Moreover, the IC is usually considered by the Trump administration as politicized, a perception which successfully results in politicization. In Israel, it’s greater than cheap to imagine that following the colossal intelligence failure of October 2023, which amongst different issues mirrored an entire failure to grasp Hamas technique and intentions, the present Netanyahu authorities misplaced belief within the intelligence system’s strategic assessments. This additionally may result in politicization. Therefore, whereas leaders can’t execute their methods with out operational and concentrating on intelligence, they could assume that their very own judgements about adversary intentions are higher than these produced by the intelligence professionals.
These challenges for strategic intelligence aren’t new, however no less than within the US and Israel in recent times, they appear to be exacerbated. These traits, subsequently, may mirror a declining demand for strategic intelligence, particularly targeted on analyzing adversary intentions. It isn’t clear, as an illustration, whether or not such intelligence was supplied to US and Israeli decision-makers previous to initiating the present marketing campaign towards Iran, concerning potential contingencies within the Straits of Hormuz? In any case, this may result in a “vicious circle”, the place diminishing demand results in lowering provide, which in flip may lower the demand, and so forth. Each leaders and intelligence professionals ought to be troubled by this phenomenon.
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